BERLIN - Despite continuing tensions over Russia's invasion of Georgia this August, the European Union will reopen talks with Russia on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). A PCA establishes a legal framework for negotiating specific agreements in such areas as trade, justice, and human rights. The current talks aim to replace the expired 1997 PCA, which remains in force by mutual consent pending a new accord.
At an emergency meeting on September 1, EU leaders refused to continue the PCA talks until Russia removed its combat units from the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The heads of the 27 EU governments also characterized the Kremlin's decision to recognize the independence of the two breakaway regions as "unacceptable." Since then, EU governments have moderated their conditions, describing a simple Russian military withdrawal from Georgian territories outside the two regions as sufficient to resume a dialogue on the PCA, energy security, and other issues.
Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of Program Management at the Hudson Institute.In order not to appear intimidated by Russia's forceful dismemberment of Georgia, NATO governments have publicly reaffirmed their support for Georgia's territorial integrity and the country's desire to join NATO eventually. In private, however, many allied officials have told the media that they are even less inclined than they previously were to deepen NATO's ties with Georgia, given the risks of becoming entrapped in another Russian-Georgian war.
At present, it seems most Western governments have decided to concentrate on helping Georgia recover economically from the war rather than on punishing Russia directly. At last month's International Donors' Conference in Brussels, they pledged billions of dollars of reconstruction aid. The EU is also considering negotiating a free-trade area with Georgia and relaxing visa rules for Georgian citizens. NATO has established a special NATO-Georgian Commission to help coordinate allied support for Georgia's post-conflict reconstruction.
Even so, Russian and Western officials continue to spar over American plans to deploy ballistic missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. In his speech in November to the Russian parliament on the state of nation, President Dmitry Medvedev warned that Russia would deploy short-range Iskander missiles in the Baltic Sea port of Kaliningrad "to neutralize if necessary the anti-ballistic missile system in Europe."
Medvedev added that Russian electronic equipment would jam the American systems and that the Russian military was preparing additional countermeasures. NATO and EU leaders denounced the threats, which seemed especially gratuitous coming one day after the American people had elected a new President who has expressed interest in improving relations with Russia.
Russia's government has also sought to showcase its growing military potential. In September and October, the country's strategic forces engaged in their largest nuclear weapons-related exercises since the Soviet Union's demise. On October 12, the Russian Navy joined with the Strategic Rocket Forces to conduct a well-integrated exercise involving near-simultaneous testing of three long-range ballistic missiles from separate ground and submarine launch platforms.
Last month, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also announced yet another increase in Russian defense spending. Russian military expenditures have increased by double-digit figures in recent years. This year, the Russian military will spend over $40 billion. The figure for 2009 could exceed $50 billion.
Although superficially impressive, this surge obscures several key issues. Much of the growth merely compensates for the exceptionally high inflationary pressures in Russia's defense sector. In addition, it will take years for the recent budget increases to translate into new equipment. Although Russian designers can still develop first-class weapons, Russia's defense companies, which have yet to recover from the traumatic disintegration of the Soviet military-industrial complex, remain unable to manufacture large numbers of the most advanced systems. Russia's military also must compete with foreign customers for those few warplanes, tanks, and other sophisticated weapons that are produced.
The long-term sustainability of Russia's military revival is also unclear. Russia's government remains dependent on oil and gas exports for revenue, but the prices of these commodities are falling sharply. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is tightly integrated into the world economy, rendering the country vulnerable to the current global financial crisis. Medvedev recently warned that Russia's "military-industrial complex is starting to be affected by credit problems," stoking fears of a return to the paralyzing payment crises that plagued the defense sector during the 1990's.
Russia's continuing demographic problems will also make it difficult for the armed forces to become a fully professional military, one that does not depend on poorly motivated conscripts. Although Medvedev and Putin have apparently adopted a viable power-sharing arrangement, Russia's stunted political institutions lack the capacity to root out corruption and other inefficiencies. Comprehensive security-sector reform remains off the political agenda. Even in the high-priority defense sector, perhaps one-third of government spending is wasted or stolen - a condition that is not conducive to realizing Russia's great power ambitions.
Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of Program Management at the Hudson Institute.
© Project Syndicate 1995-2008
